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CHAPTER I 
RATIONALE 
Deutsch (1959) indicated that individuals who score low on the 
F scale (which is a measure of authoritarianism) were significantly 
more trusting and trustworthy than individuals who score high. 
Christie and Cook (1956) suggested that individuals who score high 
on the F scale were also less intellectually sophisticated, less 
liberal in their political views, more cynical concerning human 
nature, more prejudiced toward minority groups, and to have 
experienced and to favor stricter child rearing practices, besides 
being more authoritarian. 
It is felt that dogmatism, which is a measure of open and 
closed mindedness, may also be a valid predictor of trust and 
trustworthiness due to the fact that the findings of Rokeach (1960) 
indicate that dogmatism and authoritarianism have a correlational 
range of .54 to .82. 
Since dogmatism is an integral variable in the study, 
clarification of the terra is needed. 
Because of the varied aspects of the subject, it is felt that 
an operational definition is necessary to qualify what is meant by 
the terms open and closed mindedness. In every situation it is 
assumed that there are characteristics of relevant or irrelevant 
quality to the inner structure of that situation. In order to 
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arrive at the correct response, the individual must respond to the 
relevant characteristics of the situation and selectively ignore the 
irrelevant ones. If this is accomplished, it may then be said that 
the individual responded appropriately. If he becomes preoccupied 
with the irrelevant information and makes a decision based on it, 
more than likely, it will be an incorrect decision and classified as 
an inappropriate response. As a result it is extremely important 
that each individual adequately evaluate the information he receives 
from every situation to the fullest degree possible. 
This illustrates the basic characteristics that define to what 
degree a persons' system is "open" or "closed"; namely: 
. . . the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate 
and act on relevant information received from the outside 
on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant 
factors in the situation arising from within the person 
or from the outside (Rokeach, 1960). 
Examples of irrelevant internal pressures that interfere with 
realistic reception of information are: 
. . . unrelated habits, beliefs, and perceptual cues, 
irrational ego motives, power needs, the need for 
self-aggrandizement, the need to alloy anxiety, and 
so forth. By irrelevant external pressures we have 
in mind most particularly the pressures of reward and 
punishment arising from external authority figures, 
reference groups, social and institutional norms, and 
cultural norms (Rokeach, 1960). 
From the above explanation of open and closed mindedness, it 
is deduced that the more open one's belief system the more he is 
influenced by internal self-actualization forces and less by 
irrational forces; the more he is able to shun pressure from external 
sources; the more action and evaluation proceed independently on 
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their own merits according to the inner structural requirements of 
the situation; and the more strength one has to resist externally 
imposed reinforcements, such as material reward or punishment. 
On the other hand, the more closed the belief system the more 
difficult it is to separate information received about the source 
and about the world. They become entangled to the point of 
disguising the real topic. What the external sources want us to 
believe is true becomes confused with what the external source 
depicts as true, yielding an individual who cannot distinguish the 
two kinds of information. This type of individual is not free to 
receive, evaluate, and respond on information in terms of inner 
requiredness. He is exposed to pressure, rewards and punishments 
dealt by the environment which is supposed to influence his 
evaluation in the manner the source directs. The above comprises 
the definition of dogmatism. 
As mentioned previously, it is felt that dogmatism may be a 
valid predictor of trust and trustworthiness. Verification of such 
a statement will be attempted with the assistance of a two person 
non-zero sum game, which essentially is a bargaining situation 
whereby two individuals observe and interpret each other's behavior. 
The bargaining situation is a study of the strategy of conflict, 
illustrating situations in which the ability of one participant to 
gain certain ends is dependent, to a great degree, on the decision 
made by the partner. 
The rationale for the belief that dogmatism may be a valid 
predictor of trusting behavior i3 that, generally, an individual's 
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behavior toward another person is congruent with what he expects from 
that person. Then too, what he expects from the other individual is 
in line with his behavior toward that person, since Mead (1934) and 
Parson (1955) state that "an individual's response pattern is 
governed by not only 'how to act' toward others but also by 'what to 
expect* from others". An individual with a closed mind, a high 
dogmatic person, would tend to expect and project hesitancy about 
human trust and faith; whereas the open-minded individual, a low 
dogmatic person, encounters greater human contact and believes that 
the world, in general, is composed of honest, sincere human beings. 
The open-minded person's vision and experiences are not as narrow 
or "tunneled" as the closed-minded individual, since he is not 
threatened by the inconsistencies or uncertainties of life. His lines 
of communication, both verbal and non-verbal, are more apt to receive 
incoming information; as a result he is capable of greater objectivity 
utilizing the largest amount of available information, Evidence to 
support such a viewpoint was found in a study by Conway (1967) — 
concerned with problem solving in small groups as a function of open 
and closed individual belief systems. He found that open-minded 
subjects are superior to closed-minded subjects in the area of 
communication, problem solving time, and the general acceptance and 
rejection of problems, groups, or overall situations. 
The open-minded person displaces others* feelings on himself 
and attempts to empathize with their situation, Because of his 
diversified encounters, it is realistic to state that he is more 
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accepting of the faults of man and more yielding to counteropinions. 
Evidence to support such a viewpoint may be found in the article by 
Norris (1965) where she states that open-minded individuals are more 
tolerant of situations involving cognitive inconsistency—uncertainty 
in the act of knowing—than closed-minded individuals. Hunt (1968) 
also verified such findings of cognitive inconsistency in an experiment 
concerned with the investigation of the relationship between open and 
closed mindedness and tolerance for inconsistency under conditions in 
which persons agree to prepare belief-discrepant communications for 
subsequent public examinations. As a result, it is felt that the 
open-minded individual would be a more likely candidate to be trusting 
and trustworthy than his closed-minded counterpart. 
An explanation as to why low dogmatic individuals would be more 
trusting and trustworthy than high dogmatic individuals is due not 
only to one sided internalized expectations from another; instead, 
they are internalizations of a reciprocal pattern of interrelationships 
between the subject and his encounters. This interrelationship is 
governed not only by how to act toward the other, but also what to 
expect from the other (Head, 1939, Parson, 1955). The experiment by 
Deutsch (1962) somewhat supports this belief since he concluded that, 
in experiments concerning game situations, subjects who are trusting 
tend to be trustworthy and subjects who are suspicious tend to be 
untrustworthy. In other words, an individual's response is based not 
only on how he feels for an individual but what he expects from him. 
Another explanation of high and low dogmatism could be centered 
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around personality differences between the two, even though the 
Wrightsoan study (1966) indicates that no attitude or personality 
variable was found to be related to trustworthy behavior in a two 
person game. Justification for the position that personality 
differences exist between high dogmatic and low dogmatic individuals 
is based on the concept that personality is a composite of both 
inherited differences and learned or developmental differences due to 
environmental impact. The former may bo referred to as "structural 
differences" and the latter as "content differences". 
The difference concerned with in this study does not reflect 
structural differences in values as much as it does content differences. 
These content differences have been internalized as a result of the 
individual's reaction to his socialization experiences in a designated 
social environment that is characterized by a given value pattern. 
This viewpoint indicates that trusting people and suspicious people 
do not differ in ego weakness or in the integration of the superego, 
but differ simply from unique environmental experiences. In other 
words, these differences are learned rather than inherited. 
Rokeach (1960) found that race, religion, educational background, 
intelligence and age have an affect on open and closed mindedness. 
Other areas affecting Dogmatism were the economic state of the 
individual, his vocation, and his overall past experience. No 
evidence was found of a test for sex difference influencing the open 
and closed mindedness of the individual. A study by Rapaport (1965), 
concerning sex as a factor in contributing to cooperation in the 
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Prisoner's Dilemma Game, indicated that differences do exist between 
sexes; however, the discrepancy is due to different social interaction 
patterns between males and females rather than to contrasting, innate 
propensities to cooperate. Komorita (1965) also found a difference 
between sexes where cooperative choice was concerned. He stated that 
males reciprocated cooperative choice more than females when such 
behavior maximized gain, but reciprocated less when such behavior was 
non-optimal. On the other side, however, Lutzker (1961) concluded, 
from his study concerning sex role, cooperation and competition in a 
Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game, that sex role did not influence 
cooperative and competitive behavior. Evans (1966) reaffirmed this 
position by stating that sex was not related to cooperation in the 
prisoner's dilemma game. 
As a result of the conflict concerning sex differences and 
cooperative choice where dogmatism is concerned, it is felt that 
additional information is needed to supplement the already existing 
pool of information in the area. Through additional information, a 
greater degree of clarification may be attained as to what effects sex 
differences have on individual attitudes once suitable norms are 
established. Therefore this study will attempt to uncover to what 
extent sex differences affect trusting responses in a two person 
non-zero sura game where dogmatism is held constant. 
In view of the discussion of the above material concerning 
Dogmatism, trust and trustworthiness, and the Two Person Non-Zero Sum 
Game it is felt that low dogmatic individuals will be more trusting 
or trustworthy in a two person non-zero sum game than closed minded 
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individuals due to a greater feeling of altruism and a stronger 
capacity to deal with environmental inconsistency. Low dogmatic 
individuals will remain open-minded regardless of the treatment they 
receive from others due to an overall flexibility to cope with the 
environment. It should be noted that such beliefs will be examined by 
using only the initial response of each S as the basis of judgement, 
since initial impressions at times are more congruent with the belief 
structure of the individual at the moment. It is also felt that sex 
differences will exist among individuals participating in a two person 
non-zero sum game as a result of social conditioning, which forces the 
individuals to conform to an expected role by reinforcing the antici­
pated behavior. As a result it is hypothesized that during participation 
in a two person non-zero sum game: 
I. Open-minded Ss will make more trusting first choice 
responses than closed-minded Ss. 
II. Ss who have made a previous trusting, first choice 
response will make a trustworthy, later choice response 
regardless of whether the perceived first choice partner 
responded trusting or untrusting; and Ss who have made 
a previous untwisting, first choice response will make 
an untrustworthy, later choice response regardless of 
whether the perceived first choice partner responded 
trusting or untrusting. 
Ill, A difference exists between males and females in the choice 






The £s for this study were undergraduate students from an 
introductory psychology course at Southern Illinois University. The 
Ss were chosen on the basis of the responses made to Rokeach's 
Dogmatism Scale. A total of 53 Ss were chosen from the Dogmatism 
Scale to participate in the two person non-zero sum game, 27 open-
minded individuals of which 12 were male and 15 female, and 26 
closed-minded individuals of which 14 were male and 12 female. 
Instruments 
The study was performed with the assistance of Rokeach's 
Dogmatism Scale, the two person non-zero sura game, and an apparatus 
known as a multiple response recorder. 
The Dogmatism Scale is a personal opinion questionnaire whose 
primary purpose is to measure individual differences in open and 
closed belief systems. There are several versions of the scale, with 
Form D and E being the most popular. Form E was selected for the sake 
of brevity and since the reliability figure of .79 was basod on the 
largest normative sample of 508 Ss (Rokeach, 1960). The validity of 
all forms was unknown due to an insufficient amount of existing 
information. 
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Form E contained a total of 40 questions (See page 32) to which 
the Ss were forced to choose one of six alternatives (See page 35) for 
each question, ranging from "I agree very much" to "I disagree very 
much", in order to force responses toward agreement or disagreement. 
The scale was subsequently converted for scoring purposes to a 1 to 6 
point scale for each item score. The total score for each S_ was the 
sum of scores obtained on all items in the test. The open-minded 
(low dogmatic) Ss were the ones who scored the highest number of 
total points, as compared to other members in the group, after summing 
the scores on all the items. The closed-minded (high dogmatic) Ss 
were the ones who scored the lowest number of total points. 
The two person non-zero sum game is a game based on "bargaining" 
in which two individuals watch and interpret each others behavior. 
This bargaining situation is, in essence, a study of the strategy 
of conflict. It is illustrative of situations in which the ability of 
one participant to gain certain ends is dependent, to an important 
degree, on the choices or decisions that tho other participants will 
make. The bargaining may be explicit, as when one offers a concession; 
or it may be by tacit maneuver, as when one occupies or evacuates 
strategic territory. It may seek arrangements that yield positive 
gains for both parties; or it may involve threats of damage, including 
mutual damage. 
Whatever the rationale for their choices, both parties are aware 
that his own actions are being interpreted and anticipated, and both 
respond according to the expectations that they create. 
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To obtain further information concerning the exact operational 
method and procedures of the Sum Game used in this study, refer to 
Appendix F which will discuss those matters in greater detail. 
The multiple response recorder was the instrument used to 
indicate to both the Ss and IE the point selection made by each during 
the two person non-zero sum game. 
A physical description of the response recorder is as follows: 
approximately 12 inches tall, lh inches wide, and 12 inches deep, with 
five sides of the recorder composed of wood and the one remaining side 
composed of sheet metal with one-half inch green lights spaced 
approximately one inch apart. The bottom row of the recorder consisted 
of red buttons used to indicate the desired choice. The green lights 
in the recorders were exposed in selected areas to designate a 
different numerical reward for each area (a frontal view of the 
recorder may be seen on page 37). 
There were four (4) recorders used for the two person non-zero 
sum game positioned on each side of a rectangular table. The recorders 
were separated by black curtains in order to prevent visual contact 
which may have lead to communication which was contrary to the game 
rules (an aerial view of the game room may be seen on page 36). 
Before each recorder, on a white sheet of paper, lay the possible 
reward combinations for each game in order to inform the Ss as to the 
alternatives available for every game and also the possible outcomes 
of a specific choice. The payoff sheet was seen as such: 
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AX . (  +9 + 9 ) 
AY (  -10 +10 ) 
BX (  +10 -10 ) 
BY (  -9 -9 ) 
The person with first choice was limited to the payoffs written in red 
while the person with last choice was limited to the payoffs written 
in blue.* 
Procedure 
The Dogmatism Scale was administered, on a voluntary basis by a 
person other than the E, to 158 £s of an introductory psychology 
course at Southern Illinois University with the implication that the 
scale was to function as a personal opinion questionnaire. 
* The payoff was in terms o f points rather than money 
for the obvious reason of cost to the experimentor. 
It was suspected, however, that this would not alter 
game strategy to any significant degree, since the 
Wrightsman study (1966) indicated that in a two person 
game, playing for real versus imaginary payoffs had 
little influence on the £*s game behavior. 
The designated numerical rewards and point spread was 
obtained from the Deutsch study (I960) where identical 
numerical rewards were used successfully for a similar 
study concerning the Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game. 
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Direct instructions to the Ss were as follows: 
The following is a study of what the general public 
thinks and feels about a number of important social 
and personal questions. The best answer to each 
statement below is your personal opinion. We have 
tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; 
you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the 
statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, 
and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or 
disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many 
people feel the same as you do. 
Mark each statement on the answer sheet according to 
how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark 
every one and only one mark for each question. 
This masking was instituted for several reasons—1.) to 
facilitate a free expression of ideas, and 2.) to allow such 
expression to materialize without the impending threat of further 
participation in future experimentation. 
Several weeks after the administration and scoring of the 
Dogmatism Scale, the class was revisited. At that time the students 
were informed that a certain number of individuals were selected,at 
random, to participate in a psychology experiment. The remaining 
students who were not eligible for game participation due to inadequate 
dogmatism scores were informed that they would participate in another 
psychology experiment at a later date. Such instruction wa3 given to 
create a mutual feeling of class participation in order to engender 
a serious concern from the Ss actively involved. There was no 
connection made, whatsoever, to the opinion questionnaire the Ss had 
previously completed. 
The Ss that were to participate in the sum game received the 
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following instructions on the information sheet that was circulated 
about the class: 
If your identification number is on this paper, you are 
to place your name and I.D. number on the time sheet for 
the date and time slot you desire. Try to fill-in a 
time slot where others have indicated their preference, 
since 4 individuals are needed in each slot to participate 
in the experiment. It would be desirable to have two (2) 
males and two (2) females for each time slot. 
Report to the "psychology laboratory", Room 3209, Science 
Building at the time ana date of your choice. 
It is vital that you report promptly at that time, so 
PLEASE BE ON TIME! 
Of the 53 eligible Ss, 40 Ss responded positively to the "sign-up" 
sheet, and 36 eventually appeared to participate in the game. There 
were 18 high dogmatic Ss and 18 low dogmatic Ss, with a sex ratio of 
9 males to 9 females for the closed-minded group and a ratio of 7 males 
to 11 females for the open-minded group. Every game contained at least 
one member of the opposite sex, since idontical sex pairings for a 
game may produce a different degree of cooperation or competition than 
mixed sex pairings as evidenced in the study by Rapaport (1965). 
A period of seven days existed between sign-up and actual game 
participation. This time was used to pretest the apparatus and game 
instructions so that all points of confusion could be irradicated 
before actual game participation. 
On the days specified for game involvement, for the most part 
the Ss adhered to the specified time schedule. Upon entering the 
laboratory, the Ss were handed an information sheet to complete, 
concerning family birth order. After the information was gathered. 
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the Ss were led to the game room where the apparatus and game 
instructions were examined. As the Ss entered the room, they were 
instructed to select a seat in front of a multiple response recorder 
(A graphic view of the seating arrangement and apparatus arrangement 
is illustrated on page 36). The Ss were then instructed as to the 
name of the game, the object of the game, the exact operational 
procedures of the game (verbatim game instructions are illustrated in 
Appendix F). After the instructions were read aloud and clarified to 
the satisfaction of each S, commencement of the two person non-zero 
sum game began. 
A total of 3 games were played by each group of 4 Ss. In every 
game each person was limited to one of the two choice positions, 
either first choice or last choice. When the was designated to 
choose first, selection was limited to either Letter A or Letter B. 
When the S was designated to choose last, selection was limited to 
either Letter X or Letter Y. The amount of reward each individual 
won or lo3t was determined by the S_'s placement as a result of the 
respective choice. 
From the illustrated reward combinations, it may be seen that the 
person of first choice could attain the most or lose the least by 
selecting Letter B. If B was decided upon, the reward was either a 
+10 or -9. Letter B was the most rewarding since Letter A's greatest 
reward value was +9, and it was the least detracting since Letter A's 
poorest reward value was a -10. 
In the case of the person with last choice, he could have won 
the most or lost the least by selecting Letter Y, because such a 
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choice yielded a +10 as compared to X's +9, and -9 as compared to 
X's -10. If there was a choice of BY, by the persons of first choice 
and last choice respectively, both forfeited 9 points. 
The one solution, however, in order for both players to score 
positively was to choose combination AX, This combination yielded a 
+9 for each participant. 
If, on the other hand, the person with first choice was assured 
that his counterpart would select X, he could have won more by 
selecting B. The same was true for the person with last choice; if the 
£ was assured that the person with first choice was going to choose A, 
he could have won more by selecting Y. 
To define the above explanation in terms of what play was 
considered trusting or untrusting, or trustworthy or untrustworthy the 
following was illustrated: Whenever an individual was slated to 
choose first, he could have chosen either Letter A or Latter B. If 
the S attempted to secure a maximum profit for himself while inflicting 
the maximum loss to his associate, he would have selected B which was 
considered an "untrusting play". If the £ chose to compromise somewhat 
and obtain a smaller reward for himself, yet assisting his associate 
in obtaining the same amount, the £ would have selected A which was 
considered a "trusting play". 
When the individual was given the opportunity to choose last, 
the S could have selected either letter X or letter Y, The same 
applied to him now as it did when he was given the opportunity to 
choose first. If he attempted to secure a profit for himself while 
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incurring the greatest loss to his associate, he would have selected Y 
which was considered an "untrustworthy play". On the other hand, if 
the £ had faith in his associate, he would have selected X, a "trust­
worthy play", hoping to obtain a profit both for himself and his 
associate. (A more thorough explanation of the game is given in 
Appendix F if needed.) 
The one significant aspect of this game was that, unless mutual 
trust existed, there was no possibility for "rational" individual 
behavior. Conditions were built into the game to cause each person 
to lose, should he attempt to obtain either maximum gain or minimum 
loss. Only unless the players trusted each other would it have made 
sense to choose the other alternative. 
As stated, the Ss played a total of three games; on one occasion 
they were allowed to choose first; here the £ decided as to whether 
he was going to be trusting or untrusting. 
On the other two occasions the subject chose last. This 
position allowed him the choice of being either trustworthy or 
untrustworthy. On one of the occasions of last choice, the stimulus 
he received, from what he thought was one of the other players, was 
a trusting response of Letter A. On the other occasion of last choice, 
the stimulus received, from what he thought was one of the other 
players, was an untrusting response of Letter B. 
As the Ss were assigned to the position of "last choice" the 
sequence of the received stimuli was alternated from player to player. 
For instance, Participant I received a trusting stimulus first, to 
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which he was to respond, and an untrusting stimulus last. Participant 
II was subjected to the reverse order. He received an untrusting 
stimulus first, to which he was to respond, and a trusting stimulus 
last. This sequence was upheld throughout the study to control for 
any predetermined set given to the players as a result of the type of 
stimulus received initially. Such treatment was supported by the 
Littig study (1965) where it was discovered that behavior of Ss deviate 
from expectations in two-person games; it was suggested that these 
deviations were the result of the Ss following the action of the 
other persons with whom they interact. In other words; the Ss were 
influenced by the "other player's move". 
In administration of the game, extra precaution was taken to 
insure that all Ss fully understood the instructions and the impli­
cations of any combination of choices that the £ or their associate 
might make. The Ss were assured that their counterparts had similar 
knowledge of the game. There was no orientation given to the Ss in 
regard to motivation or competition, since Deutsch (1960) indicated 
that a cooperative orientation, in a Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game, 
would lead to trusting and trustworthy behavior while a competitive 
orientation would lead to suspicious and untrustworthy behavior. 
Deutsch (1961) also indicated that when threat was present in such 
a game to both players, rather than one, agreement was most difficult; 
then too, when conditions of no threat existed for either participant, 
payoff was maximized. 
There was no information given about their associates other than 
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they were in the sane psychology course. Upon completion of the 
intended three games, duration of which was approximately twenty m?nutes, 
the Ss were thanked for their cooperation, punctuality, and serious 
concern and were dismissed from the room in order to accomodate the 
following four (4) Ss. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
A total of 60 Ss were desired to participate in the two person 
non-zero sum game. Of the 60 Ss, 53 were found eligible to participate 
in the game due to the high and low dogmatic qualities of these 
individuals. However, only 36 Ss eventually volunteered to take part 
in the game. 
The total score for each S was the sum of scores obtained on all 
items in the questionnaire. The individual total scores of the study 
ranged from 95 to 210 with a mean of 145 and a standard deviation of 
20,8 as comparod to a mean of 148 and a standard deviation of 26,1 
from Rokeach's (1960) original normative sample. The majority of Ss 
selected to participate in the game scored either above or below • 1 s.d. 
from the mean. 
The responses made by the Ss for the game wore analyzed with the 
assistance of a Chi Square test of significance of the 2 X 2 classifi­
cation design. Since small cell frequency appeared in some cases, the 
Yates Correction Factor was used to insure the greatest degree of 
accuracy of chance estimate probabilities. 
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TABLE I 
Frequency of Trusting and 
Untrusting Responses by 
Ss Classified as High 
Dogmatic and Low Dogmatic 
Response 
Trusting ...... 9 10 19 
Untrusting ...... 9 8 17 
Total ...... 18 18 36 
* -V* A Wf X = • oo ,  p> •  os 
TABLE 2 
Frequency of Later Trusting 
and Untrusting Responses by Ss 
Who were Initially Trusting" 
Stimulus Received Response 11 
A B Total 
Trusting Response.,.. 4 3 7 
Untrusting Response.. 6 6 12 
Total 10 9 19 
* X Z -  - 0 3  ,  P  >  O S  
Note: Stimulus A is used to indicate that 
the S was given a trusting stimulus in Game 2 
and an untrusting stimulus in Game 3. Stimulus B 
is used to indicate that the S was given an 
untrusting stimulus in Game and a trusting 
stimulus in Game 3. 
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TABLE 3 
Frequency of Later Trusting and 
Untrusting Responses by Ss who 
Were Initially Untrust*ing 
Response Stimulus Received 
A B Total 
Trusting Response..,.. 1 2 3 
Untrusting Response... 9 5 14 
Total 10 7 17 
*X* - Z.L7, p > >05 
Note: Stimulus A is used to indicate that 
the S was given a trusting stimulus in Game 2 
and an untrusting stimulus in Game 3. Stimulus B 
is used to indicate that the S was given an 
untrusting stimulus in Game 27 and a trusting 
stimulus in Game 3. 
TABLE 4 
Frequency of Trusting and Untrusting 
Responses for Males and Pemales 
Where Low Dogmatic Attitudes are Held Constant 
Response of Low Sex Difference 
Dogmatic Ss. penaje potai 
Trusting Response ..... 3 7 10 
Untrusting Response.... 4 4 8 
Total 7 11 18 
* X2* • ft / P >• as 
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TABLE 5 
Frequency of Trusting and Untrusting 
Responses for Males and Females 
Where High Dogmatic Attitudes are 
Held Constant 
Response of High Sex Difference 
Dogmatic Ss. Male Female Total 
Trusting Response ...... 5 4 9 
Untrusting Response..... 459 
Total 9 9 18 
. 0 0 ,  p  > .  O S  
From the above computations, it is needless to say that the 
results do not confirm the hypothesis that the Dogmatism Scale is a 
valid predictor of responses in a Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game. 
The findings of Table 1 indicated that there was no significant 
difference between high dogmatic and low dogmatic Ss in choice 
selections concerning trust and trustworthiness. The results of 
Table 2 suggested that those Ss who made previous trusting first choice 
responses did not, to any significant degree, make trustworthy later 
choice responses regardless of whether the first choice partner 
responded trusting or untrusting. Similar findings were disclosed in 
Table 3; the Ss who made previous untrusting first choice responses 
did not, to any significant degree, make untrustworthy later choice 
responses regardless of whether the perceived first choice partner 
responded trusting or untrusting. The results of Table 4 indicated 
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that there was no significant difference between males and females 
concerning their choice of a trusting first response. This sex 
difference was investigated with Ss that i«re considered low in 
dogmatism. Table 5 was also concerned with the affects of sex 
differences on trusting first choice responses, with the exception 
of using high dogmatic Ss rather than low dogmatic Ss. As with 
Table 4, the results indicated that there was no significant difference 
between males and females concerning their choice of a trusting first 
response. 
Even though the hypotheses were non-confirmable, and the results 
could have occurred more by chance than for any other reason, it is 
felt that such a treatment may be practicable given some additional 
alterations to the original proposal. This will be discussed at 
greater length in the following section with hopes of irradicating 
some of the weaknesses of the study, yet at the same time, stimulating 





As evidenced, the hypotheses in the present study were not 
substantiated. Possible explanations as to the non-confirmation of 
the hypotheses are as follows: First, perhaps the pre-game instructions 
indicating that the two person non-zero sun game is not a competitive 
game created a situation that spoiled the basic trusting or untrusting 
set of the individual. Ss that were normally untrusting in competitive 
or ambiguous situations may not have felt pressure to conform to their 
usual operational tactics for this game. As a result they responded 
at times with trusting behavior without the threat of any significant 
penalty. Trusting Ss, on the other hand, may have selected untrusting 
responses simply to view what feedback they would receive from their 
partners, most likely hoping for untrusting replies in order to 
strengthen their beliefs in the trusting philosophy. 
Second, this study, as outlined originally, was to have used a 
total of 60 Ss. Due to a lack of cooperation from some of the Ss, 
however, the sample size was reduced to a total of 36 Ss. Perhaps 
had the sample size been larger, the original hypotheses might have 
been substantiated. 
Third, had there been a greater number of games played than three, 
the Ss may have responded differently due to a change in attitude or 
motivation after warm-up. Familiarity with a process at times releases 
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inhibitory feeling felt by the participants initially, resulting in a 
total change of game strategy later on. Therefore, the warm-up effect 
may have been influential to some degree on the Ss that participated 
in the game. This viewpoint is supported by the findings of McClintock 
(1967), in an experiment concerning the effects of prior experience 
and monetary reward on a 2-choice non-zero sum game. He found that 
both of the above factors, as well as the number of times the game is 
played, are influential as to the final outcome of the game. Lave 
(1965) indicated that three factors were important in affecting 
cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. One of the three factors 
listed was the number of times the game will he repeated. 
The fourth factor that may have contributed to the non-confirmation 
of the hypotheses was the clarity of the pro-game instructions. The 
directions were written as succinctly as possible and were supplemented 
by visual aids for clarification purposes. Instructions wore read 
aloud and illustrated to the Ss simultaneously, and the final step was 
to fully clarify any remaining questions plaguing the Ss before game 
time. However, regardless of the care exerted, there is still the 
possibility of confusion on the part of the Ss as to a knowledgable 
operation of the game itself, or the consequences of their individual 
point selections. Either could have contributed, to some degree, to 
the eventual outcome of the study. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In summary, 158 Ss were administered Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale 
in order to identify the most open and closed-minded individuals of 
the sample. Thirty-six (36) 5s eventually qualified and volunteered 
to participate in tho Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game. It v/as the 
purpose of the study to demonstrate that tho Dogmatism Scale could be 
used as a valid predictor of responses in a Two Person Non-Zero Sura 
Game by illustrating that open-minded (low dogmatic) individuals were 
more trusting than closed-raindod (high dogmatic) individuals. Three 
hypotheses were established to verify the intention of the study. 
I, During participation in a two person non-zero sum 
game, open-minded individuals will make significantly 
more trusting first choice responses than closed-minded 
individuals. 
II. During participation in a two porson non-zoro sun 
game, individuals who have made a previous trusting, 
first choice response will significantly make a 
trusting, later choice response regardless of 
whether the perceived first choice partner responded 
trustworthy or untrustworthy; and individuals who 
have made a previous untrusting, first choice response 
will significantly make an untrusting, later choice 
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response regardless of whether the perceived first 
choice partner responded trustworthy or untrustworthy. 
III. Holding dogmatism constant, a significant 3ex 
difference exists in the selection of a trusting, 
first choice response. 
It was discovered, through the use of a Chi Square test of 
significance that there were no differences between high dogmatic and 
low dogmatic Ss where trust and trustworthiness was concerned. 
Individuals who made trusting responses for first choice did not, to 
a significant degree, choose a trustworthy response on the last choice 
regardless of the stimulus received. Also, individuals who made un-
trusting responses for first choice did not choose an untrustworthy 
response on the last choice regardless of the stimulus received. There 
were no differences found between males and females concerning the 
selection of a trusting response upon first choice. 
Possible explanations as to the lack of confirmation of the 
hypotheses were: 1.) damage to the basic trusting/untrusting set of 
the Ss due to pre-garae instructions, 2.) too small a sample size, 
3.) possible effects of warm-up on individual decision making, and 
'+.) a confusion of pre-gaine instructions. 
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Dogmatism Scale Questionnaire 
The following is a study of what the general public thinks and 
feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The 
best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have 
tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may 
find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing 
just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; 
whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that 
many people feel the same as you do. 
Mark each statement on the answer sheet according to how much you 
agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one and only one mark for 
each question. 
I AGREE A LITTLE I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
I AGREE ON TIE WHOLE I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
I AGREE VERY MUCH I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in 
common. 
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest 
form of democracy is a government run by those who are most 
intelligent. 
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile 
goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom 
of certain political groups. 
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better 
acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he 
opposes. 
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome 
place. 
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 
8. I'd like it if I could find somone who would tell me how to 
solve my personal problems. 
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9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of 
the future. 
10. There is so Touch to be done and so little time to do it in. 
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop. 
12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself 
several times to make sure I ara being understood. 
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in 
what I am goint to say that I forget to listen to what others 
are saying. 
14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward. 
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, ray secret 
ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or 
Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something 
important, 
17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to 
the world. 
18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a 
handful of really great thinkers. 
19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of 
the things they stand for. 
20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not 
really lived. 
21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause 
that life becomes meaningful. 
22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world 
there is probably only one which is correct. 
23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely 
to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person. 
24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous 
because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 
25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must 
be careful not to compromise with those who believe 
differently from the way we do. 
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26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he 
considers primarily his own happiness. 
27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly 
the people who believe in the same thing he does. 
28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on 
guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's 
own camp than by those in the opposing camp. 
29. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion 
among its own members cannot exist for long. 
30. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are 
for the truth and those who are against the truth. 
31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit 
he's wrong. 
32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath 
contempt, 
33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the 
paper they are printed on. 
34. In this complicated world of ours the only way wo can know 
what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be 
trusted. 
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going 
on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those 
one respects. 
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and 
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own. 
37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only 
the future that counts. 
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes 
necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all". 
39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed 
important social and moral problems don't really understand 
what's going on, 








I Agree I Agree I Disagree I Disagree 
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE TWO PERSON 
NON-ZERO SUM GAME 
My name is Tony Mance and I am a graduate student in psychology 
at this university. You have been invited to participate in an experiment 
that qualifies as research material for a thesis topic at the Masters 
level. 
The game you have been invited to play is known as a Two Person 
Non-Zero Sum Game. Since individual differences dictate how each of 
us participate in novel situations, it stands to reason that the 
majority of individuals treat a game situation uniquely. Therefore, 
the rationale for the use of this game is to see how each of you 
approach a particular game setting. 
The object of this game is to accumulate as many positive points 
for yourself as possible. This may be accomplished by either 
cooperating with your unknown associate or by competing against him. 
This is up to you! However, the total points obtained by you will not 
be compared to those points obtained by other members participating in 
the game. In other words, you will not be judged against one another 
since this is not a competitive game. In addition, the score you will 
receive will be an individual score for each of the three games. 
The game will consist of 4 players. For each play you will be 
paired off with one of the other members of the group, whose identity 
will remain anonomous to you. For each game, you ma£ or may not 
exchange partners—remember that! There will be a total number of 
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three games played by each player and the duration of all three games 
will, more than likely, not exceed ten minutes. Some of you may respond 
first during the games more times than last and vice versa. Once you 
have taken your assigned positions, all conversation will cease, since 
no verbal communication is allowed as part of the game rules. 
You may now take a seat in the assigned positions so that further 
instructions may be given as to the exact operation of the game. But 
before I go any further, are there any questions concerning what has 
been said thus far? Should questions arise at any time during the 
instructions, do not hesitate to stop me so that they may be fully 
clarified. 
The box you see in front of you is known as a multiple response 
recorder. Its appearance and use will now be explained in detail so 
you may be familiar with the apparatus. As you can see there is a 
white card covering the front of your recorder, exposing lights in 
certain areas. The left side of the card is marked Letter A or Letter B, 
alternatives available when you have first choice in a game. The right 
side of the card is marked Letter X or Letter Y, alternatives available 
when you have last choice in a game. At the bottom of the box are RED 
response buttons used to designate your choice of either A, B, X, or Y. 
There are BLUE diagonal arrows on the card. Do you see them? They are 
used to indicate the direction you should look for the "final outcome 
response" made by your partner. Indication as to whether or not you 
have first or last choice will be designated by the light marked 
"Signal for 1st Choice". Do you see it on the white card? When this 
light is on, it means that you are the one to choose first in the game. 
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You will be told verbally when to look for the signal® If you do not 
see the signal when the commentator states that it is on, then you are 
to automatically assume that you have been given the position of last 
choice. Is everything clear so far? You may now press the response buttons 
to see how they work while the use of the apparatus is being explained. 
If you are given first choice in the game, your selections are 
limited to either Letter A or Letter B located in the lower left-hand 
corner of the recorder. Upon your selection of a letter, you are to 
follow the diagonal arrow to the upper right-hand comer of the 
recorder, where you will receive information as to the selection of 
either Letter X or Letter Y by your partner. 
If you are given the position of last choice, whose alternatives 
are Letter X or Letter Y, you will first receive knowledge of your 
partner'8 selection in the upper left-hand comer of the recorder, and 
your response will be made in the lower right-hand comer. It should 
be noted that any selections made by either of the participants will 
simultaneously be acknowledged to the other partner so that both 
players will always be aware of their partner's intended point selection. 
The last variable to be explained in the instructions, and perhaps 
the most important, is a thorough understanding of the reward system, 
this is the critical part of the game, so listen carefully. 
The white sheet of paper you see before you is entitled "Possible 
Reward Combinations". There are four such possible combinations 
illustrated and are identified by the letters AX, AY, BX, BY. As you 
can see each combination is enclosed by a parenthesis with 2 numbers 
assigned to it. 
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Some of the letters and numbers are written in red and some in 
blue. The color red is used to designate the rewards available when you 
have first choice. The color blue is used to designate the rewards 
available when you have last choice. 
If you are nominated for first choice, your selection will be 
limited to either Letter A or Letter B, and you may receive the numbers 
written in RED in the parentheses. 
If you are nominated for last choice, your selection will be 
limited to Letter X or Letter Y, and you may receive the numbers 
written in BLUE in the parentheses. 
Now, once again, listen carefully for this is important. The key 
to points obtained by each player hinges on the decision made by the 
person with last choice. He is the one to decide the final points 
obtained by both players for that game. In other words he, the person 
with last choice, is in the "driver's seat" as to the points obtained 
by both players. 
For example, should you choose first and select A, you may receive 
either a +9 or a -10 depending on the choice of your partner. If he 
decides on X, you will be forced to receive a +9 and he will receive a 
+9. Should he decide on Y, you will be forced to receive a -10 and he 
will receive a +10. A similar situation is true for Letter B as for 
Letter A, except for different numerical rewards. 
Once again, when given the signal of first choice, you will respond 
by pushing the button you desire for the Letter you desire. When this 
is accomplished the letter you have selected will light up simultaneously 
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in both boxes, so as to inform the person of last choice as to your 
selection. When the person of last choice is to take his pick, he 
will respond in the same manner as you, with the exception of selecting 
either Letter X or Letter Y instead of Letter A or Letter B. His 
selecting will be done by pressing the button of his choice for the 
desired letter. This action will produce the illumination of that 
choice in both his recorder and in the one of his associate's. Letters 
selected by both players will indicate to each the final outcome of 
their selections, which means the number of points they, individually, 
will receive for that game. 
Are there any questions? Do you understand everything that we 
have covered? 
Once again, here are some important variables to keep in mind 
during the game: 
1. There will be a total of 3 games played by each player. 
2. Your partner will be unknown to you, and you will not have 
the same partner for each game. 
3. The possible combination of points for each game are listed 
before you in parentheses with AX, AY, BX, and BY as the choices. 
4. You are to obtain as many positive points as possible. You 
will not be judged against your fellow players since this 
game is not a competitive one. 
Upon completion of the formalized instructions, additional 
instruction, for clarification purposes, was administered to those 
individuals in need of further assistance in order to participate in 
the game. 
